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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal was poured over to the Court of Appeals on February 2, 1994,
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the document entitled "Letter of
Intent to Enter Employment Agreement" constituted a contract of employment between appellant
EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak") and appellee John Diston.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Buehner Block Co. v. U. W.C* Associates, 752
P.2d 892 (Utah 1988); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah
1988).
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Frederick Ninow had apparent
authority to hire Diston as an employee of EnviroPak.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d 884.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The only determinative statute in this matter is the statute of frauds. That provision
provides in relevant part as follows:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement...
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 25-5-4(1).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an action by plaintiff/appellee John Diston ("Diston")
alleging breach of an employment contract between Diston and defendant/appellant EnviroPak
Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak"). Diston asserted that a document titled "Letter of Intent to
Enter Employment Agreement" ("letter of intent") constituted a binding contract and that
EnviroPak had breached the contract by refusing to employ him in accordance with the terms of
the letter of intent. EnviroPak denied that the letter of intent was a binding contract and further
denied that Frederick Ninow, who signed the letter of intent had authority to do so on behalf of
EnviroPak.

Diston further claimed that defendant/appellant Surgical Technologies, Inc.

("Surgical") was liable as the alter ego of EnviroPak.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: The complaint was filed on April 21,
1992 and included claims for breach of contract, including a separate third-party beneficiary
claim, intentional interference with economic relations and fraud. Appellants brought a motion
for summary judgment on May 26, 1993 The trial court granted that motion as to the claims for
third-party beneficiary rights and fraud. The remaining claims were tried on July 19 and 20,
1993. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 16, 1993, and
the judgment was entered on November 18, 1993. The trial court awarded Diston a judgment in
the amount of $54,834.60 against both EnviroPak and Surgical. Appellants filed a notice of
appeal on December 9, 1993. The appeal was poured over from the Supreme Court on February
2, 1994.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
In 1991, plaintiff/appellee John Diston (Diston) was employed as the assistant director of
peri-operative services at Holy Cross Hospital where he was paid a yearly salary of $40,000.
(R. 00624, FF 5.) He did not receive the use of a car (or a car allowance), stock options or
bonuses as part of his compensation. (R. 00624-25.) At the same time, Frederick P. Ninow
(Ninow) was employed by a company called Professional Medical in the area of marketing.
(R. 00734, FF 6.) During his employment with Professional Medical, Ninow began planning for
Professional Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of a new product line, consisting of
pre-packaged, reusable surgical gowns and equipment. (R. 00736-37, FF 7.)
Ninow became acquainted with Diston as a result of Ninow's efforts to promote the new
products. (R. 00734-35, 36, FF 8.) Ninow's efforts were aimed at having Professional Medical
produce and market the new products. (R. 00737.) Diston arranged for the products to be tested
at Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 00583.) As their relationship developed, Ninow suggested the
possibility of Diston coming to work for Professional Medical, and Diston eventually met with
another representative of Professional Medical, although employment discussions went no
further. (R. 00739, 00626.) Professional Medical began marketing the products to Holy Cross
Hospital but was unable to undertake large-scale production or marketing. (R. 00740-41.)
Ninow and Diston began planning for the formation of a new company to market the
products on a large scale. (R. 00741, FF 9.) Ninow, Diston and others participated in preparing
a business plan for the new company. (R. 00742, FF 9-11.) The plan included a list of names
and corresponding positions within the proposed company.

(R. 00627, 00587-89, 0592-95.)

Ninow and Diston met several times throughout the spring and fall of 1991 to discuss formation

1

Citations to the findings of fact are abbreviated FF, followed by the paragraph number. The findings of fact and
conclusions of law are found at pages 00516 through 00527 of the record and are attached as appendix 2.
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of the new company and Diston's involvement and eventual employment. (R. 00593.) All of
this activity occurred prior to any contact with Surgical. (R. 00025-27.)
Ninow was unable to arrange funding for his own company. In the summer of 1991,
Ninow was introduced to the principals of Surgical. (R. 00745, FF 12.)

After a period of

negotiation, Ninow and Surgical agreed to form EnviroPak as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Surgical for purposes of manufacturing and marketing the products.
FF 13.)

(R. 00845, 00671-72,

EnviroPak was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of Surgical, and an

Organization Agreement for EnviroPak was prepared on September 19, 1991. (R. 00671, FF 1315.) Diston had no involvement in organizing EnviroPak. (R. 00627-28.) Diston had not even
heard of Surgical until Ninow informed him in September of 1991 that Surgical was going to
finance the new company. (R. 00597-98, 599.) In September of 1991, Diston's only source of
information about Surgical and EnviroPak was Ninow. (R. 00598.)
Ninow became employed with EnviroPak on October 1, 1991, as the president, a director,
and chairman of the board of directors. During the period of the negotiations between Surgical
and Ninow leading up to the formation of EnviroPak, there was no contact of any kind between
Surgical and Diston. (R. 00627-28.) Diston's sole contact was with Ninow. (R. 00598.) No one
at EnviroPak or Surgical was aware that Diston was expecting to be employed by EnviroPak
(R. 00852, 00670), and no one was aware that Ninow had been discussing employment with
Diston. (R. 00672-74,75.)
On September 20, 1991, two weeks prior to his actual employment with EnviroPak,
Ninow went to Diston's home where he met with Diston and Rochelle Mills-LaRocca, another
employee of Holy Cross Hospital. (FF 25.) Ninow had also been discussing employment with
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Ms. Mills-LaRocca. (Mills-LaRocca depo at 12.)2 Ninow gave Diston a document titled Letter
of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement (letter of intent) (see appendix 3) and gave a virtually
identical letter to Rochelle Mills-LaRocca. (R. 00803, 00762A, 00601, 00757; Mills-LaRocca
depo. at 6-7, 10, 11; appendix 7.)
Ninow did not consult with EnviroPak before giving the letter of intent to Diston.
(R. 00758, FF 23.) Ninow also showed Diston parts of the EnviroPak organization agreement
(R. 00602), as well as a copy of Ninow's own employment agreement.

(R. 00760; Mills-

LaRocca depo. at 12, 14.) Ninow's employment agreement provided that he would become
employed with EnviroPak as of October 1, 1991 (appendix 4).
Mills-LaRocca met with Ninow and Diston on September 20, 1991, when Ninow brought
both letters of intent. (Mills-LaRocca depo. at 10, FF 25.) Ninow's own employment agreement
had not been executed (FF 19), and Ninow's employment did not commence until October 1,
1991 (appendix 4.) Although Diston claimed that Ninow displayed the EnviroPak organization
agreement at this meeting, Mills-LaRocca stated that she had never seen it. (Mills-LaRocca
depo. at 31.)
The letter of intent (appendix 3) states, among other things, that Diston and EnviroPak
would enter into an employment agreement on or before October 31, 1991, and that Diston, as an
incentive to enter into that agreement, would be provided with unspecified stock options.
(R. 00759-60; appendix 3.)

No one from EnviroPak had authorized Ninow to hire any

employees for the new company despite several attempts by Ninow to do so. (R. 00846-50.)

2

The Mills-LaRocca deposition was received by the trial court in its entirety. (R. 00576.) The deposition was
apparently misplaced and was not included as part of the record on appeal. Appellants have, therefore, attached as
part of the appendix (#8) to this brief the portions of the deposition cited in this brief.
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Diston expected that a formal, complete written agreement would be prepared.

(R. 00634,

FF 28.)
The letter of intent provides in full as follows:
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT (this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and
between ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized
and existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON
("Employee").
1.
INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991.
2.
three years.
3.

Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall be for

Compensation.

(a)
For all services rendered by Employee, the Company shall
pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in twenty-four (24)
equal semi-monthly payments. All salary shall be subject to withholdings
and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be reviewed annually and
shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the
board of directors of the Company.
(b)
As an incentive compensation, Employee shall participate
in the Company's cash incentive compensation pool.
(c)
The Company shall provide health and medical insurance
to be chosen by the Company for its full time employees.
(d)
The Company
automobile allowance.

shall

provide

Employee

a

monthly

(e)
The Company shall provide Employee with stock options
as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement with the Company.
The Company shall also provide Employee with future stock options as
part of the Company incentive program. These options will be determined
by the Company at the time of employment.
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(f)
The Company will pay for actual and reasonable expenses
incurred by Employee in connection with the business of the company,
including expenses for entertainment, travel and similar items.
(g)
The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation
of at least two (2) weeks.
Diston wanted to know what his job title and duties would be. (R 00604.) He was told
by Ninow that he would be the vice-president in charge of quality control and production.
(R. 00604.) Diston was also told that an employment agreement much like Ninow's would be
prepared to reflect Diston's employment with EnviroPak. (R. 00760.) Diston believed he was
being hired as a vice president of EnviroPak. (R. 00604.) Diston also believed he might be
appointed to the EnviroPak board of directors. (R. 00640.) He acted with the understanding that
EnviroPak was going to follow the business plan he and Ninow had prepared. (R. 00652.)
Surgical organized an informational meeting on October 3, 1991 to explain and
demonstrate the new product. (R. 00850, 00674A.) Diston attended the meeting at Ninow's
invitation. (R. 00674A, 00611.) He was introduced first to Todd Crosland, an officer and
director of EnviroPak, as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital where the new product was being
used. (R. 00850.) Although he had already received the letter of intent, Diston said nothing to
the Surgical or EnviroPak representatives about working for EnviroPak. (R. 00850, 00675.) At
the meeting itself, Diston was introduced as a representative of Holy Cross, and he discussed the
hospital's ongoing use of the products. (R. 00753, 00674A-75; Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20.)
Ninow continued to mention Diston as a potential employee (R. 00675), but never mentioned the
letter of intent to anyone. (R 00680.) Diston gave notice to Holy Cross Hospital on October 9,
1991 that he would be leaving. (FF 31.)
During the middle of October, Surgical held a series of meetings with stockbrokers to
discuss the new products and the formation of EnviroPak. (R. 00851, 00678.) Diston was
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invited to those meetings by Ninow. (R. 00679.) On each occasion, Diston was introduced as a
representative of Holy Cross, a current product user. (R. 00851, 00679, 00637-38.) Diston never
said anything to the EnviroPak representatives about employment. (R. 00851, 00679-80, 0063538.) After one of the meetings, Diston was asked by Rochelle Schutjer, an officer and director
of EnviroPak, how Diston was able to attend these meetings and be away from Holy Cross.
Diston replied only that he was taking vacation time. (R. 00880.)
At Ninow's request, Mills-LaRocca met with Crosland and Schutjer during the middle of
October to negotiate the terms of her employment. (Mills-LaRocca depo. at 21-22.) During the
meeting she realized that Ninow did not have the authority to hire employees as he had claimed.
{Id. at 17, 21.) She realized that the other principals of EnviroPak were not aware of her letter of
intent and that her employment terms would not necessarily match what Ninow had put in the
letter of intent. She did not even mention the letter during her interview. {Id. at 21, 23-26; R.
00676.) All of the terms of her employment were negotiated during that meeting and, although
her letter of intent provided otherwise, she did not receive stock options and was given only a
one-year employment term. {Id. at 23; R. 00677'-78; cf. appendix 7.)
Mills-LaRocca told Diston that same day that she had met with the principals of
EnviroPak and that the terms of her employment differed from the letter of intent. {Id. at 25-26.)
Diston did not discuss employment with the directors of EnviroPak during October 1991 - his
sole contact continued to be Ninow.

(R. 00643.)

Diston assumed, but without consulting

anyone, that he would be hired based on the letter of intent. (R. 00643.)
During that same period of time, Ninow and the other principals of EnviroPak were
discussing potential employment terms with Dick HoUingshead. (R. 00633). Diston was aware
of these negotiations and that HoUingshead was unhappy about the terms being proposed.
(R. 00632-33.)

Although HoUingshead was listed in the business plan and was originally
8

intended to be part of the new company (R. 00632), he was not hired by EnviroPak. (R. 00633).
Rochelle Mills was not listed in the plan, but she was hired. (R. 00677-78; appendix 6.) At the
time Diston claims he told Ninow that he accepted the job according to the letter of intent, Diston
had not had any conversations with anyone from EnviroPak. (R. 00637.)
The principals of EnviroPak later learned that Ninow had been negotiating employment
terms with Diston, as well as others, and that Ninow had been making other unauthorized
representations and taking other unauthorized actions on behalf of EnviroPak. (R. 00846-50,
00524.) As a result, Ninow was terminated from EnviroPak in December 1991. (R. 00683-84,
00708, FF 38.) On October 31, 1991, EnviroPak learned of the letter of intent Ninow had given
to Diston, and the officers contacted Diston to discuss the situation. (R. 00680-82.) Although
the position Diston wanted did not exist (R. 00685, 00712), and Diston did not have the technical
experience to manage the EnviroPak plant, (R. 00683), he was offered employment with
EnviroPak primarily in the area of sales, at a salary of $60,000 per year, plus a company car.
(R. 00615, 00682-85, 00324, FF 40.)
He declined that offer, claiming that he was entitled to have a job title and to know what
duties he was to perform. (R. 00614-16, 00645, FF 40-41.) It was explained to Diston that titles
were not essential because the company was so new and that everyone would have to assist in
getting the company started. (R. 00615, 00685.) Diston later accepted employment with FHP at
$35,000 per year with no written contract. (R. 00615-16, 00618, 00625, 00646.) EnviroPak
remained in business until December of 1992, but then ceased operations because it was losing
money. (R. 00678, 00865-66, 00525, FF 43.)
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Diston brought this action on April 21, 1992, alleging breach of contract, intentional
interference with economic relations (against Surgical), third party beneficiary rights under the
EnviroPak Organization Agreement and fraud.

(R. 00002-00015.)

The trial court granted

summary judgment to defendants-appellants as to the third party beneficiary and fraud claims.
(R. 00380.) The remainder of the case was tried before the Honorable David E. Roth on July 19
and 20, 1993. The court ruled in plaintiffs favor and awarded damages for breach of contract for
the period during which Diston would have been employed with EnviroPak. After considering
defendants' objections to plaintiffs proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court
entered findings and conclusions on November 16, 1993, and entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff on November 18, 1993, in the amount of $54,834.60, plus pre and post-judgment
interest. (R. 531-32.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LETTER
OF INTENT WAS A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN
ENVIROPAK AND DISTON
The letter of intent is not an employment contract. It lacks the two fundamental terms of

an employment agreement: compensation and duties. Without these terms, which together
constitute the mutuality of obligation required for any enforceable agreement, there was never
anything more than a notion that a contract might be formed in the future.

Diston himself

admitted that he expected a written agreement that would include all of the terms of his
employment.
In addition, because the letter of intent purports to cover a three-year employment term, it
is governed by the statute of frauds. As a result, it must be complete on its face as to all of its
essential terms — in this case compensation and duties — before it rises to the level of an
10

enforceable contract. The letter fails that test. It is far too vague, leaving much for future
negotiation, for the trial court to have concluded that there was a meeting of the minds of the
parties. It is at best an agreement to agree, an offer to negotiate — or as its title suggests, a letter
of intent to make a contract later.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NINOW HAD
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LETTER OF INTENT ON
BEHALF OF ENVIROPAK
Diston relied solely and unreasonably on Ninow in believing that he would be employed

by EnviroPak. From the beginning, before he ever gave his termination notice to Holy Cross
Hospital, Ninow's representations of authority were suspect. EnviroPak did nothing to support
any kind of reliance on Ninow. Diston admits that his sole contact was Ninow. He was thus
under a duty to ascertain Ninow's true authority. But Diston had more than a legal duty. He had
many clear signals that EnviroPak had no intention of employing him, and definitely not
according to the letter of intent.
EnviroPak continually represented Diston as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital, a user
of the new product.

Diston never asked anyone about employment despite numerous

opportunities to do so and numerous circumstances strongly suggesting that he should. The facts
of this case throw into question just exactly what Diston was supposedly relying on. It is
undisputed that Diston had no contact at all with EnviroPak prior to October 3, and his only
contact after that point would have convinced anyone to at least inquire as to Ninow's authority.
Instead, Diston did nothing. Because Diston did not ascertain Ninow's true authority, Ninow had
no apparent authority to hire Diston.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LETTER
OF INTENT WAS A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN
ENVIROPAK AND DISTON
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of

the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness to be enforced."

Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). See also

Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("a contract can be enforced by the courts only if
the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.")
Thus, when an essential term of an agreement remains subject to future negotiation, there is at
best "a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract in the future . . . " Davison v. Robins,
517 P.2d 1026, 1028-29 (Utah 1973).
Mutual assent to the essential terms of a proposed agreement is required before a contract
is formed. Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Assoc, 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). When
a purported employment contract is in issue, it must, at the very least, contain terms reflecting the
duties of, and compensation for, the proposed employment. See J.
CONTRACTS

CALAMARI

& J.

PERILLO,

§ 2-13, at 43, n.17. In Bishop v. Hendrickson, 695 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1985), the

plaintiff brought an action against his law partner to enforce an oral agreement to employ his
daughter at their law firm. Recognizing that the terms of an agreement must be "reasonably
certain," the court held that a promise to employ someone that does not include the proposed
position "and factors such as salary and terms of employment" is not enforceable as an
employment agreement because it lacks certainty.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

3

Id. at 1314-15, citing

§ 33 (1979).3

Section 33 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS provides, in full, as follows:
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RESTATEMENT

"An offer cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless there is sufficient
specification of terms so that the obligations involved can be ascertained." K-Line Builders, Inc.
v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 677 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Ariz. App. 1983), rew. denied.
See also Page & Wirtz Construction Co. v. Van Doran Bri-Tico Co., 432 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.
1968); 3

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§ 7:14, at 307 (4th ed. 1992). This is just another way of

describing the requirement of certainty — the first indicator that there has been a meeting of the
minds. See Engineering Associates, 622 P.2d at 787; Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428.
Under certain circumstances, a contract term may be left for future determination (as
opposed to negotiation) based on an agreed formula, such as for the price of goods, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

§ 33, comment a. An agreement governed by the

statute of frauds is not permitted such latitude. To satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement
must be complete on its face as to all its essential terms. In order to comply with the statute of
frauds, the writing on which a party relies must specify the obligation of the parties or it is
unenforceable. Abba v. Smyth, 59 P.756, 757-58 (Utah 1899); Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952); Machan Hampshire Properties v. Western Real Estate & Dev.
Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989).*

(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted
so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.
(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.
The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a
manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.
4
Accord, Nay v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Utah 1956). (In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the
memorandum must identify the parties, the subject matter and "set out the conditions of the transaction with
adequate certainty.") See also Collett v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1951) ("the memorandum must show
what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that some contract was made").

13

In Birdzell, plaintiff attempted to enforce an extension of a sublease based on oral
discussions and a letter containing several terms, but which left the monthly rental open to future
negotiations. 242 P.2d at 579. At issue was whether the letter was a sufficient memorandum
under the statute of frauds, which governed inasmuch as the proposed sublease was for a period
longer than one year. Id. at 580. "By its very language, the letter [purported] to be nothing more
than an expression of willingness" to enter into an agreement. Id. Without the essential term of
the monthly payment, the memorandum failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.
When the statute of frauds applies, parol evidence may not be used to supply any
essential terms of the agreement. Abba, 59 P. at 757-58. A court is not permitted to supply
missing terms. Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). See also Barker
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987) (parties must agree on the essential elements for
contract to be formed).5
AM

The Letter of Intent by Itself Demonstrates That Essential Terms Were
Left For Future Negotiation and the Execution of a Formal Written
Agreement

The title of the letter of intent, "Letter of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement," is
certainly indicative of what Ninow and Diston intended. Indeed, Ninow told Diston to expect
"another document that would be exactly like mine or very similar to mine, with some changes,
of course, reflecting [Diston's] arrangement. (R. 00760.) The most glaring omission from the
letter of intent is any mention of job title and duties. These were essential to Diston. (R. 0061416,00645.)
Further, the letter itself provides:
5

See also Neeley v. Bankers Trust Co. of Texas, 757 F.2d 621, 628 and n.5 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied (holding
that when promises are indefinite and speak to an essential element of the contract, the entire purported agreement
fails and observing that the court may not supply such terms) (quoting Willowwood Condominium Assoc, v. HNC
Realty, 531 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1976).
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1. INTENT. [EnviroPak] intends to enter into an employment agreement with
employee on or before October 31, 1991.
(appendix 3)
If EnviroPak were indeed intending to enter into an employment agreement more than
two weeks after the date of the letter of intent, then it is impossible for the letter of intent itself to
be that employment agreement.

Moreover, the letter of intent appears to be intended to

encourage Diston to negotiate further. With respect to proposed stock options, the letter provides
as follows:
The Company shall provide Employee with stock options as incentive to enter
into an Employment Agreement with the Company.
(Id)
Importantly, the stock option provision appears as part of Distorts purported
compensation.

As an essential term of an employment agreement, compensation must be

specifically set forth. However, the letter of intent provides that the stock options "will be
determined by [EnviroPak] at the time of employment." Diston had never even seen the stock
option plan under which he claimed a right to participation. (R. 00650-51.) Moreover, there
could not possibly have been a meeting of the minds as to Diston's compensation based on such
an open-ended term.
Similarly, although the letter refers to additional compensation in the form of a cash
incentive pool, there are no terms as to Diston's proposed rights in that incentive pool. By its
very terms, therefore, like the letter in Birdzell, Diston's letter of intent is, at best, exactly what its
title says, with many details left to negotiate. As such, it is nothing more than an expression of
willingness and an invitation to negotiate.6
6

Such letters of intent are frequently exchanged as preliminary to an agreement and part of the negotiation dance.
As such, they are "usually understood to be non-committal statements preliminary to a contract." CALAMARI &
PERILLO at 33. Therefore, even though Ninow and Diston may have believed that they formed an agreement

15

Some of the alleged terms of employment, which in this case are critical because they
were part of Diston's anticipated compensation, were so indefinite that the trial court was unable
to award damages based on them. (R. 00472-73.) If, as the trial court found, the letter of intent
is in reality an enforceable employment contract, then Diston's compensation must be clear
because it is fundamental to an employment agreement. However, with respect to the stock
options, the court concluded that "there are too many unknowns . . . to determine what, if any,
value those options would have had to the plaintiff." (R. 00472.)7
The same was true with respect to the cash incentive compensation pool mentioned in the
letter of intent.

There was simply no evidence as to the terms of plaintiffs participation.

(R. 00473.) For the same reasons of indefiniteness, the court declined to award damages for the
car allowance. (R. 00473.) With so many unknowns regarding Diston's compensation, to say
nothing of the omission of any duties of employment, it was error for the court to conclude that
an enforceable contract existed.
B.

The Letter of Intent is Not an Enforceable Agreement Because Diston
Himself Expected That a Written Agreement was Forthcoming

Diston fully understood that the letter of intent was only preliminary and that a complete
written agreement would be prepared. He testified as follows:
Q:
Did you contemplate [at the time you received the letter of intent] that
there would be a more detailed agreement entered into?
A:
yes.

Uh — yes. I felt with the provisions that were in our original agreement,

(R. 00761), the purported agreement must stand on its own from an objective theory rather than the long abandoned
subjective theory of contracts. "If the content of the [proposed] agreement is unduly uncertain and indefinite no
contract is formed
" CALAMARI & PERILLO, at 43.
7
The court described the many missing terms in connection with the stock option. There was no agreement as to
the number of shares, the price or the exercise period. (R. 00472.)
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Q:

And so you expected a written agreement at some point in the future?

A:

Yes. I felt that a little bit more formalized, yes.

(R. 00634.)
In addition, because Diston had no understanding as to his participation in the stock
option program, including the exercise price and time limitations (R. 00628-32), as well as his
rights, if any, under the cash incentive compensation pool (appendix 3; R. 00473), he could not
possibly have believed reasonably that the letter of intent constituted his employment agreement.
That is consistent with his testimony that he anticipated a subsequent agreement (R. 00634), and
with the fact that Ninow told him an employment agreement just like Ninow's would be
prepared. (R. 00760.) The differences between the letter of intent (appendix 3) and Ninow's
agreement (appendix 4) are self-evident. Diston conceded, for example, that the circumstances
under which he could be terminated would be included in his employment contract. (R. 00640.)
Moreover, Diston believed strongly that he was entitled to a job title and description,
detailing his duties so that, in his words, he would not be "cleaning toilets." (R. 00645, 00614.)
Diston's instincts were accurate as an employee's duties are an essential element of an
employment contract.

CALAMARI

&

PERILLO

at 43; Bishop, 695 P.2d at 1315. The letter of

intent, of course, says nothing about Diston's title or duties. In fact, Diston later refused to accept
a job offer from EnviroPak, even though that offer was still $20,000 more than what he had been
receiving at Holy Cross Hospital and $25,000 more than he now receives at FHP, because he was
not promised a particular title. (R. 00615-616, 00645.)8

8

Diston believed that he was free to create his own title and duties. Although he expected to be a director of
operations under the business plan (R. 00639-40), at trial Diston actually referred to the letter of intent "to refresh
[his] memory, just as to what role [he] was to play and what [his] job title was going to be." (R. 00604.) One
wonders just what language in the letter of intent refreshed Diston's recollection that he would be the "vice
president in charge of quality control and production." Id
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C.

The Letter of Intent is Not an Enforceable Contract Because it Fails to
Satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

Any agreement, "that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof must be in writing. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1). Moreover, M[i]t is fundamental that
the memorandum which is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the
essential terms and provisions of the contract. Birdzell, 242 P.2d at 580. See also Machan
Hampshire Properties, 779 P.2d at 234.
The letter of intent states that the proposed employment term is three years, thus bringing
it within the statute of frauds. As a result, the letter must be complete in all its essential terms
before it is enforceable.

There are numerous deficiencies in the letter of intent. The very

language of the letter of intent specifies several items of compensation that remain to be
negotiated, and it utterly omits other terms customarily found in employment agreements such as
termination provisions, remedies, vacation and sick leave. Most importantly, the letter of intent
is silent with respect to Diston's proposed duties.

This was an essential term to Diston.

(R. 00614-16, 00645.)
To satisfy the statute of frauds, the essential terms of such an agreement must be in
writing. The letter of intent refers to compensation beyond a base salary in the form of stock
options, cash incentives and a car allowance, but leaves them entirely open to negotiation.
Without a description of Diston's duties, the letter is, at best, nothing more than an expression of
willingness to negotiate. As such, it is not an enforceable contract.
D.

The Letter of Intent is, at Best, Only an Agreement to Agree in the
Future and is Thus Unenforceable

Agreements to agree are unenforceable.

See, e.g., Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of

Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash. App. 1979) (agreement to negotiate a contract in the future is
nothing more than negotiation); Weil & Assoc, v. Urban Renewal Agency of Wichita, 479 P.2d
18

875, 883 (Kan. 1971). "The logic is that an agreement to agree on a particular term shows a lack
of present agreement and also leaves the agreement indefinite." CALAMARI & PERILLO, at 51.
An agreement providing that an essential term "was subject to the future mutual
agreement of the parties . . . constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract in the
future, for the whole matter was contingent on further negotiations." Davison, 517 P.2d at 102829. See also Engineering Associates, 622 P.2d at 787 (where the parties make it clear that they
do not intend legal consequences until a formal writing is executed, there is no contract until that
time).9
By its very terms, the letter of intent states that the parties would enter into an
employment agreement in the future. It contemplates expressly that certain terms were left to
future negotiation and agreement. The two most essential terms of an employment agreement,
namely compensation and duties, remain unspecified. While Diston's proposed yearly salary is
specified, that is only part of the alleged compensation package. His purported stock options and
cash incentive participation remain undefined, as does his automobile reimbursement. Moreover,
Diston promises to do nothing under the letter of intent despite his concern with his titles and
duties. (R. 00614-16, 00645, 00695.).10

9

See also Southland Corporation v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988) (there is no agreement when it
cannot be determined "whether the minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms
they agreed. . . . "
10
Akin to this point is the underlying requirement of any contract that there be consideration on both sides. Under
the terms of the letter of intent, there is no consideration on Diston's part because he has not committed himself to
do anything in exchange for the yearly salary and other unspecified compensation. Sometimes referred to as
mutuality of obligation, the requirement of consideration is inescapable and is lacking here. See Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542
(Utah App. 1989).
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT NINOW HAD
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LETTER OF INTENT ON
BEHALF OF ENVIROPAK
M

[A]n agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's actions unless the agent

is acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority." Zions First National Bank v. Clark
Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah 1988).11 Apparent authority "flows only from the acts
and conduct of the principal," and then only when a third party is aware of, and reasonably relies
on, that conduct. Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d at 1095. In Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672
P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983), the court observed that "apparent authority exists 'where a person has
created such an appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to
believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first person . . .' " (quoting Winn
v. McMahon Ford Co., 414 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. App. 1967).
In City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89 (Utah 1983), the
Supreme Court stated as follows:
It is well settled law that the apparent or ostensible authority of an agent can be
inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal. . . . Where corporate
liability is sought for acts of its agent under apparent authority, liability is
premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct of
its agent which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. . . . Nor is
the authority of the agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the person with
whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause third parties to believe that the
agent is clothed with apparent authority. . . . It follows that one who deals
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority
despite the agent's representations.
Id. at 90 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation ofPres.
ofCh,

Etc., 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); Kiniski v. Archway Motel Inc., 586 P.2d 502 (Wash.

1

* There is no issue in this case as to any actual authority allowing Ninow to execute the letter of intent, or any
other agreement for that matter, on behalf of EnviroPak. The court expressly found only apparent authority.
(R. 00468.) For a discussion of the contours of actual authority, which will be found whenever there is express or
implied authority, see Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d at 1094-95.
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App. 1978);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 43 (1980); Kuehn v. Kuehn, 642 P.2d 524

(Colo. App. 1981), reh'g denied (1982); Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980);
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982); Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204,
209 (Utah 1993).
A.

EnviroPak Did Nothing to Cause Diston to Believe Ninow Had
Authority to Execute Contracts or Hire Employees on its Behalf, and
EnviroPak Had No Knowledge of and Did Not Acquiesce In Ninow fs
Conduct

Ninow admitted that he did not discuss the letter of intent with anyone at EnviroPak and
that he prepared it without any involvement by anyone at EnviroPak. (R. 00758.) Diston knew
that Ninow had prepared the letter himself.

Ninow's employment agreement and the

Organization Agreement were prepared by EnviroPak's attorney.

(R. 00642-642A, 00520.)

Moreover, Diston admits to having had no contact whatsoever with anyone from EnviroPak until
October 3, 1991, three weeks after he received the letter of intent from Ninow. (R. 00597-98, 99,
00627-28.)
Even then, EnviroPak did nothing to cause Diston to believe that Ninow had authority to
do anything or to cause Diston to believe that Diston would be hired by EnviroPak. (R. 00753,
00674A-75, 00680.)

Indeed, even at the October 3, 1991 shareholders meeting and the

subsequent meetings with stockbrokers (R. 00851), Diston was consistently introduced by
EnviroPak representatives as a representative of Holy Cross Hospital, which was then the only
user of the product. (R. 00753, 00674A-75, 00851, 00679, 00637-38; Mills-LaRocca depo. at
20.)
The organization agreement for EnviroPak was executed on September 19, 1991.
(R. 00671.) Although the organization agreement does refer to an employment agreement with
Ninow, that employment agreement, which Diston read, was not effective until October 1, 1991.
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(R. 00760; appendix 4.) It was not even executed when Diston saw it. (FF 19.) It was not
EnviroPak that showed these agreements to Diston. Ninow did that himself. (R 00602.)
Either Ninow misrepresented when his employment with EnviroPak began, and there is
no question that he was not yet employed when he prepared and delivered the letter of intent, or
Diston failed to read Ninow's employment agreement. In either event, EnviroPak did nothing to
cause Diston to believe that Ninow could hire Diston or otherwise bind EnviroPak to any
agreement. Nor did EnviroPak do anything to cause Diston to believe he was going to be hired.
Diston will undoubtedly point to EnviroPak's press release of September 19, 1991,
announcing its formation and stating that Ninow would be an executive officer.

(R. 00756.)

However, there is no evidence of any kind even suggesting that Diston ever saw the press
release.
B.

Diston Failed To Inquire Into Ninow's Authority Despite His Obligation
To Do So

Reasonable reliance is an essential element of apparent authority. Clark Clinic, 762 P.2d
at 1095; Walker Bank & Trust, 672 P.2d at 75. "The 'apparent' aspect of apparent authority
requires observation of irregularities as well as indicia of authority. Where such irregularities
cast reasonable doubt and suspicion as to the apparent authority of a fiduciary, there comes into
being a duty of inquiry as to his authority." Bridgeport Fireman's Sick and Death Benefit Assoc.
v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 633 F.Supp. 516, 522 (D. Utah 1986). Once the duty
to inquire arises, and it always does when one deals exclusively with a purported agent,
Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78, it is not reasonable for the person to rely on agent's conduct or
statements. Deseret Federal, 633 F.Supp. at 522. See also Walker Bank & Trust, 672 P.2d at 74.
In other words, any reliance must be reasonable and prudent under the circumstances before
apparent authority can exist. Id.
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In J&JFood Centers v. Selig, 456 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1969), relied on in Deseret Federal,
the court stated as follows:
Facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish apparent authority only when a
person exercising ordinary prudence, acting in good faith and conversant with
business practices and customs, would be misled thereby, and such person has
given due regard to such other circumstances as would cause a person of ordinary
prudence to make further inquiry.
456 P.2d at 694, quoted in Deseret Federal 633 F.Supp. at 522.
In Deseret Federal, the court concluded that certain irregularities in a transaction were
sufficient to raise a duty of further inquiry and, failing such inquiry, reliance on the agent's
representations was unreasonable. 633 F.Supp. at 522. A bank had released funds, despite an
irregularity on the face of a document indicating that the person withdrawing the funds may not
have had authority to do so. Specifically, a signature that indicated apparent authority actually
belonged to a past corporate officer no longer capable of signing for the corporation. Id. at 520.
Based on a second letter showing that the officer had already been removed, the bank "was on
notice" that the signature could not bind plaintiff and thus could not confer apparent authority.
Id See also Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209-10.
Because Diston admits to having dealt exclusively with Ninow (R. 00598, 00643), he was
obligated to ascertain Ninow's authority "despite [Ninow's] representations" that he had
authority. Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78. This he did not do. At best, Diston may have asked
Ninow about Ninow's authority (R. 00602.) That inquiry is insufficient, for a purported agent
cannot establish his or her own authority. Id. Diston's obligation was to inquire of EnviroPak.
Id.12

Where Diston's contact was limited exclusively to Ninow, there was never even an

12

Diston claims that, because he was dealing with the president and chairman of the board, he did not need to
inquire further. (R. 00643.) Diston could not, of course, have actually believed that because Ninow's own
employment did not begin until October 1, 1991-two weeks after Diston received the letter of intent, (appendix 4.)
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opportunity for EnviroPak to create the impression vis-a-vis Diston that Ninow was authorized to
hire employees.
Even after he learned that the letter of intent was not the basis for employment at
EnviroPak and that Mills-LaRocca had negotiated her employment with the board of directors
(Mills-LaRocca depo. at 25-26), Diston did nothing. He knew that Mills-LaRocca, who had an
identical letter of intent from Ninow, had to meet with the entire board before her employment
terms were established. (R. 00643.) Diston also knew that an employment contract still had to
be prepared. (R. 00760, 00634.)13
Diston was also aware of EnviroPak's negotiations with Dick Hollingshead, who Diston
knew was included in the business plan as the proposed president. (R. 00632-33; appendix 6.)
In September of 1991, Diston knew that Hollingshead had been negotiating with EnviroPak (not
just Ninow) regarding his employment and was never hired. (R. 00632-33.) Diston believed that
Surgical was involved in these negotiations and believed that Surgical was "adamant" that
Ninow be president of EnviroPak. (R. 00633.) Despite these facts, Diston "assumed" without
ever asking that he would be employed based solely on the letter of intent. (R. 00643.)
Diston first met with representatives from EnviroPak on October 3, 1991 at a
shareholder's meeting. (R. 00850.) That meeting occurred six days before Diston tendered his
resignation at Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 00636.) Despite the opportunity to do so, Diston said
nothing about employment, instead relying entirely on Ninow's representations. Diston again
met with representatives of EnviroPak in mid-October, immediately after he tendered his

13

Diston testified rather unconvincingly that he thought Mills-LaRocca's meeting with the members of the
EnviroPak board of directors "was merely a courtesy." (R. 00643.) He could not reasonably have believed that,
having seen that Hollingshead had been in similar negotiations (R. 00632-33) and learning from Mills-LaRocca
herself that those very same directors had negotiated terms of employment that differed from the letter of intent.
(Mills-LaRocca depo. at 25-26.)
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resignation (R. 00851, 00678), and still said nothing about employment. (R. 00680, 00675.) At
all of these meetings, Diston was introduced strictly as a Holy Cross Hospital representative, and
nothing was said concerning employment. (R. 00753, 00674A-75, 00851, 00679, 00637-38;
Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20.)
This failure to make inquiry is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that Diston was
leaving a job he had held for fourteen years and was about to embark on an entirely new venture
at twice his former salary, plus stock options in a company about which he knew nothing.
(R. 00597-99.) Indeed, Diston believed he was a "key employee," that he was going to be the
next vice president of EnviroPak with a right to share in the profits, and even possibly a member
of the board of directors. (R. 00603-04, 00640, 00645.)
"The duty of inquiry may be easily discharged by making simple inquiry directly with the
principal. If this had been done in the case at bar, the problem here presented would have been
avoided." 633 F.Supp at 522. What was true in Deseret Federal is also true here. Had Diston
asked even once during the many opportunities he had, he would have learned that Ninow had no
authority to bind EnviroPak to an employment agreement and that EnviroPak had no intention of
hiring him under what terms there are in the letter of intent.
Instead, Diston did nothing, despite clear signals that he could not rely on Ninow. In fact,
all indications were that EnviroPak thought of Diston only as a Holy Cross Hospital
representative and that EnviroPak knew nothing at all of the letter of intent. (R. 00637-38,
00679; Mills-LaRocca depo. at 20, 25-26.)
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CONCLUSION
The letter of intent is exactly what it purports to be and nothing more. It fails as an
enforceable contract because it is merely an agreement to agree and because it does not satisfy
the statute of frauds.
Ninow did not have apparent authority to hire employees for EnviroPak. Diston concedes
that his sole contact, before and after EnviroPak was formed, was Ninow. EnviroPak did nothing
to cause Diston to believe that Ninow was authorized to negotiate employment agreements
entirely on his own ~ without the involvement of the rest of the board. All indications were to
the contrary. Mills-LaRocca's meeting with the board that resulted in terms different from the
letter of intent and the failed HoUingshead negotiations, coupled with the fact that EnviroPak
continually represented Diston as an employee of Holy Cross Hospital, render Distonfs "reliance"
on Ninow's authority completely unreasonable. Diston failed to discharge his duty to inquire
about Ninow's authority and thus had no right to rely on Ninow's representations.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court for any or all of the above
reasons and enter a judgment of no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this C H ^ d a y of March, 1994.
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60 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

FILED DISTRICT CCUBT
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 6 19!

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DISTONf
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

v.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC.f a Utah corporation, and
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
formerly PINNACLE
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 920902269CN
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July
20, 1993, before the Honorable David Roth, Judge presiding, and
the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendants,
jointly and severally, for:
1.

The sum of $54,834.60; plus

EXHIBIT A

2.

$7,329.48 , representing pre-judgment interest from the

date each payment was respectively due to September 1, 1993,
with pre-judgment interest at $15.24 per day until entry of
the Judgment herein; plus
3.

Interest from and after date of judgment at the legal

rate until paid.
DATED this /<?

S

>-^>^
day of

X ^ ^ "

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 26

day of

"D^^^M^ /

1993, I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENTf by causing the same to be mailed, postage
pre-paidf to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSEf LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Ut^h<78410;

ORiGtOc DOCUMENT ">N rA ~
©6TWCTQ0UHT,3AL1 ^ A £

Ofumt
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Tab 2

NOV 1 6 1S93

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DISTON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
formerly PINNACLE
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 920902269CN
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July
20, 1993, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable David
Roth, Judge, presiding and hearing all evidence. Plaintiff
appeared in person by and through his attorney, Neil R. Sabin.
The Defendants appeared through their representatives and their
attorney, Ellen Maycock.

The Court, having reviewed the

pleadings and documents on file herein, having heard testimony
and observed and considered the respective credibility and the
testimony of the witnesses, having heard arguments and reviewed

EXHIBIT

ft

memoranda and documentation submitted by the parties, and being
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, John Diston ("Mr. Diston") is an individual

and resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc.

("EnviroPak"), was incorporated as a Utah corporation and at all
times relevant herein had its principal place of business in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
3.

Defendant Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical"),

is

a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County, Utah.

Surgical was formerly known as Pinnacle

Environmental, Inc. The name of that corporation was changed to
its current name April 15, 1992. At all relevant times, Pinnacle
was qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah.
4.

Surgical is a public company, having various

subsidiaries.
5.

Mr. Diston was employed at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt

Lake City, Utah, from 1977 until October 31, 1991. As of the
termination of this employment, his title was Assistant Director
of Peri-Operative Services.
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6.

During late 1990 and early 1991, Frederick P. Ninow

("Mr. Ninow") was associated with a company called Professional
Medical.
7.

While associated with Professional Medical, Mr. Ninow

undertook planning and efforts anticipating Professional
Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged
supply packets featuring principal components that are laundered,
sterilized and pre-packed for repeated use in surgical and other
health care procedures (the "Product").
8.

Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston became acquainted while Mr.

Ninow was investigating the anticipated Product and the nature of
a possible market for that Product.
9.

When Professional Medical was unwilling or unable to

attempt to market the Product on a large scale, Mr. Ninow decided
to leave Professional Medical, to form his own company and to
raise money for marketing the Product.
10.

During this time, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston began

discussing their respective roles with that new company, with the
understanding that Mr. Diston was to be a member of that new
company and to serve as Director/Operations.

Preliminary

discussions were also made with other persons for future
involvement with the new company.
11.

During that time, Mr. Ninow, with some input from Mr.

Diston and others, wrote a rough and general business plan
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regarding the proposed company financing, operation and marketing
of the Product.
12.

Mr. Ninow was acquainted with a son of Rex Crosland,

chairman of Surgical. As a result of discussions between those
persons, Mr. Ninow became introduced to principals of Surgical,
including Rex Crosland, Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer in
the Summer of 1991, several months after his association began
with Mr. Diston.
13.

Pursuant to the discussions between Mr. Ninow and the

Surgical representatives, those parties agreed to establish
EnviroPak, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Surgical, for
marketing of the Product.
14.

Surgical caused Surgical's counsel to prepare the

Articles of Incorporation for EnviroPak, an Organization
Agreement among Surgical, EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, and an
Employment Agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow.
15.

Mr. Ninow, EnviroPak and Surgical, as the sole

shareholder of EnviroPak, executed the Organization Agreement,
dated September 19, 1991.
16.

The Organization Agreement provided, among other

things, that: EnviroPak was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Surgical; that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the board
and president of EnviroPak; that EnviroPak would enter into an
Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneously
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with the execution of the Organization Agreement; that Mr. Ninow
assigned to EnviroPak his business plan; that Surgical could
designate two directors of EnviroPak; that Mr. Ninow could also
choose another director of EnviroPak; and that EnviroPak would
have considerable autonomy of operation.
17.

Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer served as directors

of EnviroPak as designated by Surgical.
18.

The Organization Agreement was silent on the issue of

whether Mr. Ninow had the authority to hire employees for
EnviroPak and to make a commitment for any particular salary.
19.

The parties executed an Executive Employment Agreement,

between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, also prepared by EnviroPak's
counsel.
20.

This was subsequently executed.
The Executive Employment Agreement provided that Mr.

Ninow was employed by EnviroPak as president, as director, as
chairman of the board of directors, and as chief operating
officer "with all of the rights, powers and obligations normally
associated with such position."
21.

On September 19, 1991, the same date as the

Organization Agreement, Surgical prepared and caused release of a
news release regarding the formation of EnviroPak and, in that
release, referred to Mr. Ninow as "EnviroPak President and CEO."
22.

Throughout his discussions with Surgical, Mr. Ninow

advised Mr. Diston as to the nature of Mr. Ninow's discussions
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with Surgical, since both individuals expected Mr. Diston to be
part of the company marketing the Product.
23.

There was no evidence that Rockwell Schutjer or Todd

Crosland knew Mr. Ninow had offered employment to Mr. Diston
until after execution of the letter of intent between EnviroPak
and Mr. Diston.
24.

Because of Mr. Ninow's specific responsibilities with

EnviroPak, pursuant to the Organization Agreement and the
Executive Employment Agreement, Mr. Ninow believed that he had
the authority to enter into an employment arrangement with Mr.
Diston.
25.

Mr. Ninow delivered the letter of intent to Mr. Diston

and, also, delivered a letter of intent to Rochelle Mills-LaRocco
on or about September 20, 1991.
26.

Pursuant to Mr. Diston's and Mr. Ninow's discussions,

on September 20, 1991, Mr. Ninow, signing as the "duly authorized
officer" of EnviroPak, executed a Letter of Intent to Enter
Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") with Mr. Diston
as the employee.
27.

The Employment Agreement provided that Mr. Diston would

be employed for three years commencing on or before October 31,
1991; would receive a salary of $72,000 per year, payable biweekly; would receive a monthly automobile allowance; would
participate in the company's stock option program; would receive
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health and accident insurance; would be reimbursed for business
expenses; would participate in the incentive compensation
program; and would receive two weeks paid vacation.
28.

Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow both contemplated that Mr.

Diston would enter into a formal, complete employment agreement,
consistent with the Letter of Intent, at a later time.
29.

After preparation of the Employment Agreement, Mr.

Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed to a $360.00 per month
automobile allowance for Mr. Diston.
30.

Mr. Diston informed Mr. Ninow that he accepted that

agreement and that he intended to give notice to terminate his
employment at Holy Cross Hospital.
31.

On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, in reliance on

the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his
intent to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991.
32.

Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the Employment

Agreement fully binding upon Mr. Diston and EnviroPak.
33.

Because of the acts of EnviroPak and Pinnacle in

drafting the Organization Agreement, Employment Agreement and
issuing the press release, Mr. Ninow believed he had the
authority to execute the Letter of Intent. Under the
circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Mr. Diston to
rely on Mr. Ninow's authority.
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34.

Mr. Diston's reliance on the Letter of Intent and

giving notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination were
reasonable under the circumstances.
35.

After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross

Hospital, Mr. Diston became aware of problems between Mr. Ninow
and Surgical.

Mr. Diston was, for the first time, informed of

problems affecting the job.
36.

Mr. Diston asked Holy Cross Hospital whether he could

receive his job back.

He was told, however, that Holy Cross

Hospital had made arrangements and commitments with other
personnel and, accordingly, it was not possible to get the job
back.
37.

Surgical, as the sole shareholder of EnviroPak failed

to observe the separate corporation structure format and
operation of EnviroPak which included at least the following:
a.

Under paragraph 3 of the Employment Agreement, Mr.

Ninow served at the pleasure of the board of either Surgical
or EnviroPak, suggesting that Surgical retained significant
control over EnviroPak.
b.

Surgical was the sole entity and source of the

funding of the business and anticipated business of
EnviroPak.
c.

EnviroPak was capitalized with only $1,000

capital, which was grossly undercapitalized for the
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anticipated business of this type and illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss.
d.

The corporate formalities were not observed

between Surgical and EnviroPak.

The failure to maintain the

corporate formalities and separateness reasonably and likely
created the potential of inequitable results leaving
EnviroPak totally dependent upon Surgical.
38.

Disputes arose between persons who were representatives

of Surgical and EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow.

Pursuant to these

disputes, Mr. Ninow, before December 10, 1991, was terminated
for, among other things, failing to consult with the board of
directors of EnviroPak on important decisions, including whether
to hire employees.
39.

Given the nature of the disputes and the actions of Mr.

Ninow, it is not unreasonable to determine that Mr. Ninow should
have been fired in this case.
40.

Mr. Diston subsequently met with Todd B. Crosland and

Rockwell P. Schutjer.

During discussions, these Surgical and

EnviroPak representatives offered Mr. Diston employment with
EnviroPak for $60,000, but without the other benefits which Mr.
Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment
Agreement. Moreover, they refused to provide any specificity of
the job or any written agreement.
41.
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42.

Mr. Diston, having measured the risks of a three year

contract which was not honored, together with the risks of a
contract offered by Pinnacle without a time period and as an
employee at will contract, was reasonable in rejecting the offer.
43.

EnviroPak ceased business operations effective December

31, 1992.
44.

Insufficient evidence exists for the court to determine

that Pinnacle purposely, or negligently, was responsible for the
failure of the business of EnviroPak.
45.

Mr. Diston was unemployed from October 31, 1991, until

February 24, 1992, at which time he became employed with FHP
Health Care where he continues to be employed.
46.

From February 24, 1992, until December 31 1992, Mr.

Diston earned $29,165.40 as gross income.
47.

The difference between what Mr. Diston earned from

October 31, 1991, through December 31, 1992, and what Mr. Diston
was to be paid under the Employment Agreement was $54,834.60.
48.

Mr. Diston reasonably could not be expected to be

entitled to damages beyond the date of December 31, 1992, because
the business ceased to exist and the parties understood at the
time of entry of their agreement that it was a risky undertaking.
49.

Insufficient evidence exists with respect to the terms

and calculations of any damages for failure of stock options and
for incentive bonuses.
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50.

With respect to the monthly car allowance, no evidence

is before the Court as to what percentage of time or use the Mr.
Diston was required to use the car in connection with his
Employment with EnviroPak.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Mr. Ninow had the apparent authority to enter into the

Employment Agreement with Mr. Diston.
2.

Mr. Diston reasonably relied upon Mr. Ninow's apparent

authority to enter into the Employment Agreement.
3.

Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed on the essential

provisions of the Letter of Intent to the extent that it provided
for an offer of employment of a term of years and for a specific
salary and, hence, there existed a valid agreement between
EnviroPak and Mr. Diston.
4.

Because of the understandings and agreements contained

in the Letter of Intent, and the reliance of Mr. Diston on the
contract, the statute of frauds does not apply; and the
Employment Agreement constitutes an enforceable agreement.
5.

Mr. Diston was ready and willing to perform under the

Employment Agreement and was not in breach thereof.
6.

EnviroPak breached the Employment Agreement with Mr.

Diston and refused to perform thereunder.
7.

Because there existed such a unity of interest between

Surgical and EnviroPak and the failure to observe separate
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corporate form, such arrangements sanctioned the possibility of
fraud or otherwise promoted injustice; EnviroPak was a hollow
shell and not a viable entity; and EnviroPak was an alter ego of
Surgical.
8.

As a result, the breach of contract by EnviroPak also

constituted a breach of contract by Surgical.
9.

There does not exist sufficient evidence for a claim of

tortious interference of economic benefits against Surgical.
10.

Mr. Diston is entitled to damages for breach of

contract in the amount of $54,834.60, representing the difference
that Plaintiff earned from October 31, 1991, through December 31,
1992, and the amounts that he would have been entitled to earn
under the contract with EnviroPak, together with interest at the
pre-judgment rate for each deficient amount of compensation
payment from that date the payment was due.
11.

Plaintiff is not entitled to any payments since

December 31, 1992, because EnviroPak's business was terminated

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

a/
I hereby certify that on this ~^

day of September, 1993,

I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by causing the
same to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 8j
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Tab 3

LETTER OF INTENT
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
(this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS I N C , a corporation organized and
existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON
("Employee") .
1.
INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991.
2.
Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall
be for three years.
3.

Compensation.

(a)
For all services rendered by Employee, the Company
shall pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments.
All salary
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes.
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board
of directors of the Company.
(b) As
an
incentive
compensation,
Employee
shall
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool.
(c) The Company
shall provide health and medical
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time
employees.
(d) The Company
automobile allowance.

shall

provide

Employee

a

monthly

(e)
The Company shall provide Employee with stock
options as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement
with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program.
These options will be determined by the company at the time of
employment.
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel
and similar items.

-1-

(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid
vacation of at least two (2) weeks.

LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written.

ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.

-2-

Tab 4

EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
THIS EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this -Agreement") is entered into
effective October 1, 1991, by and between ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah (the "Company"), and FREDERICK
NINOW ("Executive").
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants contained herein and of the mutual
benefits to the parties to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Employment. The Company hereby employs Executive to perform those duties generally
described in this Agreement, and Executive hereby accepts and agrees to such employment on the
terms and conditions set forth.
2.
Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall be for a period of Ave years commencing
on the date of this Agreement, unless earlier terminated in the manner provided herein. If not
terminated in writing by the Company or Executive, this Agreement shall continue in effect on a
month-to-month basis subsequent to expiration of the initial term. Executive understands and
acknowledges that this Agreement may be terminated by the Company during the initial term in
accordance with the express provisions of this Agreement and may be terminated at any time
subsequent to the initial term, by either the Company or the Executive on 15 days' written notice to
the other.
3.
Duties. During the term of this Agreement, Executive shall be employed by the
Company, subject to change by the board of directors, as the chief operating executive of the Company
and shall have all of the rights, powers, and obligations normally associated with such position.
Executive agrees to serve, at the pleasure of the board of directors of the Company or any parent of the
Company, as president, director, and chairman of the board of directors of the Company and in such
additional and/or other offices or positions with the Company or any parent or subsidiary of the
Company as shall, from time to time, be determined by such board of directors, without compensation
other than as set forth herein. Executive shall devote his full working time, attention, and energy to
the business of the Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and shall not during the term of
this Agreement be engaged in any other business activities which will significantly interfere or
conflict with the reasonable performance of his duties hereunder.
4.
Best Efforts. Executive agrees that he will faithfully, industriously, and to the best of his
ability, experience, and talents, perform his duties under the terms of this Agreement and will seek to
promote and develop the business of the Company.
5.

Compensation

(a)
For all services rendered by Executive, the Company shall pay to Executive a
salary of $100,000 per year, payable as earned in 24 equal semi-monthly payments. All salary
payments shall be subject to withholding and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be
reviewed annually and shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by
the board of directors of the Company.
(b)
As incentive compensation, Executive shall participate in the Company's cash
incentive compensation pool from which the Company allocates and pays to its key executives
cash incentive compensation based on the Company's pretax profits as a percentage of revenues,
as follows:

-1-

Percent of Pre-Tax
Profits Allocated
to Compensation Pool
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%

Pre-Tax Profits as a
Percentage of Gross Revenues
i 5%, but less than 20%
20%, but less than 25%
25%, but less than 30%
30%, but less than 35%
35% or more

Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000,
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be
allocated to such incentive compensation pool.
6.
Working Facilities. The Company shall provide Executive with such reasonable working
facilities and services, including an office and secretarial assistance, as are necessary and appropriate
for the performance of his duties. Such facilities and services shall be provided to Executive at the
Company's principal place of business or such other place as may be reasonably determined by the
board of directors of the Company.
7.
Employment Benefits. The Company shall provide health and medical insurance for
Executive in a form and program to be chosen by the Company for its full-time employees. Executive
shall be entitled to participate in any retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock option, or other plan as
now in effect or hereafter adopted by the Company on the same basis as other employees.
8*
Vacations. Executive shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation of at least three
weeks. Vacation shall be taken by Executive at a time and with starting and ending dates mutually
convenient to the Company and Executive. Vacation or portions of vacations not used in one
employment year shall carry over to the next succeeding employment year, but shall thereafter expire
if not used within such succeeding year.
9Expenses. The Company will reimburse Executive for actual and reasonable expenses
incurred by Executive in connection with the business of the Company, including expenses for
entertainment, travel, attendance at conventions, employee training, and similar items, on
Executive's periodic presentation of an itemized account of such expenses, together with supporting
documentation.
10. Ownership of Discoveries. Executive agrees to fully and completely disclose any and all
present and future inventions, improvements, discoveries, techniques, or products (the "Discoveries")
related to the business or proposed business of the Company resulting from Executive's activities
during the term of this Agreement, whether such activities are performed on or off the premises of the
Company. All such Discoveries shall be the sole and exclusive property of the Company. Executive
agrees to provide all information and data concerning such Discoveries in his possession or control to
the Company and to lend reasonable assistance to the Company concerning the use and application of
such Discoveries and shall execute and deliver all such documents and take all such other actions as
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are reasonably necessary to vest all right, title, and interest in such Discoveries, including patents,
copyrights, and trademarks with respect thereto, in the Company.
11. Covenant Not to Compete During Term of Agreement. During the initial term of this
Agreement and any extension subsequent to the expiration of the initial term, Executive agrees not to
engage, directly or indirectly, in any business or activity, whether as an employee, equity proprietor,
or partner, of any corporation or association that competes in any geographic market with the
Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall not be a
breach of the provisions of this paragraph for Executive to purchase equity securities in the ordinary
course of his investments if Executive's sole affiliation with such business or association is the
ownership of 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association.
12. Covenant Not to Compete Subsequent to Term of Agreement. Executive acknowledges
that he will acquire and develop certain methods, skills, and expertise in the operation and conduct of
the business of the Company during the course of his employment with the Company. Executive
agrees that for a period of one year subsequent to the expiration or earlier termination of the initial
term of this Agreement or any extension of that initial term, he will not, directly or indirectly, provide
services similar to those services to any business, corporation, or other entity that:
(a)
Provides services or products similar to or competitive with the services or
products provided by the Company to past, present, or prospective customers of the Company;
(b)
Competes with the services or products provided by the Company in any
geographic market; or
(c)
Is undertaking entry into a geographic market that is similar to or competitive
with the markets of the Company.
The covenants contained in this paragraph shall be construed as a series of separate covenants, one for
each state in the United States of America and one for each country outside the United States of
America. Except for geographical coverage, each separate covenant shall be deemed identical in its
terms. If in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate covenants
deemed included in this paragraph, the unenforceable covenant shall be deemed eliminated from this
paragraph for the purpose of that proceeding and to the extent necessary to permit the remaining
separate covenants (meaning the covenants with respect to the remaining geographical areas) to be
enforced.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed as restricting Executive's right to own shares
or other equity interests in any corporation or association provided that Executive does not perform
services for, or participate in any way in the management of such entity in violation of the provisions
of this paragraph and that Executive owns 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association.
The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
13. Nondisclosure of Information. Executive acknowledges that he will have access to
confidential data and information which is of a special and unique value to the Company, including,
without limitation, the books and records of the Company relating to operations, finances, accounting,
sales, personnel, and management; technical information related to proprietary rights of the
Company; information with respect to customer names, addresses, and requirements; price lists; costs
of operations, services, and products of the Company; and methods of doing business. Executive agrees
to keep himself fully informed of the policies and procedures established by the Company for
safeguarding its property and will strictly comply with those policies and procedures at all times.
Executive agrees he will not, during or after the term of this Agreement, divulge or appropriate to his
own use or the use of others, or maliciously divulge to any other person, any trade secret, proprietary
item, or any item designated "Confidential" by the Company, its parents, or subsidiaries. For
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purposes of this Agreement, the term "trade secret" shall mean any information, process, or procedure
utilized by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries which is not public information and which is
maintained on a confidential basis by the Company, specifically including its methods of pricing,
biding processes and procedures, supplier lists, supplier agreements, and training procedures. The
term "proprietary item" shall mean any item of information or data and any processes or procedures
owned by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries specifically including its customer lists, methods
of operation, and special procedures utilized in its operations. Executive agrees that he will not,
except as authorized by the Company, remove any property belonging to the Company from its place of
business. Executive hereby covenants and agrees to return all documents, information, and data to
the Company immediately upon termination of this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph
shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
14.
Remedies on Default. If, at any time, Executive breaches, to any material extent, the
provisions of paragraphs 10,11,12, or 13 hereof, the Company shall have the right to terminate all of
its obligations to make further payments under the terms of this Agreement. Executive hereby
specifically acknowledges that monetary damages to the Company for the breach of certain provisions
hereunder, specifically including the ownership of Discoveries as set forth in paragraph 10, the
covenants not to compete set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12, and the nondisclosure of information set
forth in paragraph 13, may be difficult to determine and/or inadequate to compensate the Company for
a breach thereof, and hereby agrees that in the event of any breach by Executive of such provisions,
the Company, in addition to any other remedies it may have under the terms of this Agreement or at
law, shall have the right to bring an action in equity for an injunction against the breach or threatened
breach of such obligations or seeking specific performance of the obligations of Executive thereunder.
If the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
15.
Disability. If Executive is unable to perform his services by reason of illness or
incapacity for a period of more than 12 consecutive weeks, the compensation thereafter payable to him
by the Company during the continued period of such illness or incapacity shall be reduced by 50%.
Executive's full compensation shall be reinstated on his return to full employment and discharge of his
full duties. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Company may terminate this Agreement
at any time after Executive shall be absent from his employment, for whatever cause, for a continuous
period of more than six months or for an aggregate of nine months in any 24-month period, and all
obligations of the Company under the terms of this Agreement shall thereon terminate.
16. Termination bv the Company. In addition to its rights to terminate this Agreement set
forth elsewhere herein and notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, this Agreement
and the Executive's employment may be terminated by the Company on the occurrence of any of the
following:
(a)
Executive's conduct involving the business affairs of the Company constituting
common law fraud, conviction of a felony, embezzlement from the Company, or other willful or
malicious unlawful conduct of a similar nature;
(b)

Any material breach by Executive of the provisions of this Agreement; or

(c)
Executive has been grossly negligent in the performance of his duties, has
substantially failed to meet reasonable standards established by the Company for the
performance of his duties, or has engaged in any material willful misconduct in the performance
of his duties hereunder.
If this Agreement is terminated by the Company in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph 16 or as provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the Company shall have no further
obligation to make further salary payments to Executive under the terms of this Agreement.
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17.
Death During Employment If Executive dies during the term of this Agreement, the
Company shall pay to the estate of Executive the compensation that would otherwise be payable to
Executive up to the end of the month in which his death occurs.
18. Nontransferability. Neither Executive, his spouse, his designated contingent
beneficiary, nor their estates shall have any right to anticipate, encumber, or dispose of any payment
due under this Agreement. Such payments and other rights are expressly declared nonassignable and
nontransferable except as specifically provided herein.
19. Indemnification. Except for willful misconduct by Executive, the Company shall
indemnify Executive and hold him harmless from liability for acts or decisions made by him while
performing services for the Company if such indemnification is permitted by the Company's certificate
of incorporation and bylaws, including any future amendments. The Company shall use its best
efforts to obtain coverage for Executive under any insurance policy now in force or hereinafter
obtained during the term of this Agreement insuring officers and directors of the Company against
such liability.
20. Assignment. This Agreement may not be assigned by either party without the prior
written consent of the other party.
21.
Stock Options. The Company's parent, Pinnacle Enfironmental, Inc. ("Pinnacle"), shall
issue to Executive options to purchase common stock under Pinnacle's 1989 Incentive Stock Option
and Stock Award Plan options to purchase common stock of Pinnacle as follows:
(a)
Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of
50,000 shares at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at an exercise price of $2.50 per
share, the approximate fair market price of Pinnacle common stock as quoted on the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Automated Quotation system ("NASDAQ") as of the date
hereof;
(b)
Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of
50,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at a
purchase price of $2.50 per share; provided, that options with respect to 25,000 shares shall
expire on September 30,1992, if at least one repackaging center is not opened and in operation
by such date, and further provided, that options for an additional 25,000 shares shall expire on
September 30, 1993, if Pinnacle has not opened and placed in operation one additional
repackaging center by such date; and
(c)
An option to purchase 5,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time during a
five-year period at an exercise price .equivalent to the bid price of the Pinnacle common stock in
the over-the-counter market as of the date of grant, for every repackaging center opened prior
to September 30,1996, issuable on the date of such opening.
All options shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the incentive stock option plan and the
related form of option that is attached to such plan.
22.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties
with respect to any written or oral negotiations, commitments, and understandings. No letter,
telegram, or other communication passing between the parties hereto shall be deemed a part of this
Agreement; nor shall a subsequent communication have the effect of modifying or adding to this
Agreement unless it is distinctly stated in such letter, telegram, or other communication that it is to
constitute a part of this Agreement and is signed by the parties to this Agreement.
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23. Counterparts and Headings. This Agreement may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one
and the same instrument. All headings in this Agreement are inserted for convenience or reference
and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
24. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the laws of the state of Utah.
25. Arbitration. In the event of a dispute or controversy between the parties as to the
provisions or performance of this Agreement, such dispute or controversy shall be submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The
Company and Executive shall each bear 50% of the third party costs of such arbitration.
26. Severability. If and to the extent that any court of competent jurisdiction holds any
provision, or any part thereof, of this Agreement to be invalid or unenforceable, such holding shall in
no way affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement.
27. Waiver. No failure by any party to insist upon the strict performance of any covenant,
duty, agreement, or condition of this Agreement or to exercise any right or remedy consequent upon a
breach hereof shall constitute a waiver of any such breach, any subsequent breach of the same
obligation, or of any other covenant, agreement, term, or condition.
28.
Litigation Expenses. If any action, suit, or proceeding is brought by a party with respect
to a matter or matters governed by this Agreement, all costs and expenses of the prevailing party
incurred in connection with such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid by the
nonprevailing party.
AGREED AND ENTERED INTO as of the datefirstabove written.
THE COMPANY: ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.

ily Authorized Officer
EXECUTIVE:
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ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT
THIS ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement-) is entered into this 19th day of
September, 1991, by and between FREDERICK NINOW, an individual ("Ninow"), ENVIRO PAK
MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. (the "Company"), a Utah corporation, and PINNACLE
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, and sole shareholder of the Company ("Pinnacle")
on the following:
Premises
Ninow has developed a business plan to package, market, and service prepackaged medical
supplies for various health care procedures and desires to participate in the organization of a business
enterprise to implement such business plan. The Company has or can obtain financial, managerial,
and other resources that it can provide to such enterprise. Pinnacle, as the sole shareholders of the
Company desires to provide certain incentives to Ninow and other persons associated with the
Company. Therefore, the parties desire to join together in organizing a business and operation to
implement the business plan developed by Ninow.
Agreement
NOW, THEREFORE, upon these premises which are incorporated herein by reference, and for
and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth herein, it is hereby agreed as
follows:
1.
Organization of Company. Immediately preceding the execution of this Agreement, the
Company has been organized as a Utah corporation with articles of incorporation in the form attached
hereto as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. As set forth in such articles of incorporation,
the sole incorporator and initial director of the Company is Todd B. Crosland. The Company will elect
the following persons as officers and directors:
Frederick N inow
Rockwell D. Schutjer
Todd B. Crosland

Director, Chairman, and President
Director and Vice-President
Director and Secretary/Treasurer

2.
Assignment of Business Plan. Ninow hereby assigns, conveys, and sets over unto the
Company all of Ninow's right, title, and interest in and to a business plan, procedure, method of
practice, and related know-how, information, business contacts, relationships, and other information
relating to the initiation and operation of a business enterprise to market to hospitals and other health
care providers prepackaged supply packets containing materials frequently used in surgical and other
health care procedures, featuring principal components that are laundered, sterilized, and repackaged
for repeated use, rather than disposed of, all as more particularly described in the materials attached
hereto as exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference (the "Business Plan").
3.
Autonomous Operation. During the term hereof, the Company shall have its own
management, budget, physical facilities, and accounting books and records so as to retain its separate
identity from Pinnacle and its other subsidiaries. During such period, Pinnacle shall cause the board
of directors of the Company to consist of four persons, one of whom shall be Ninow, one of whom shall
be a person designated by Ninow, and two of them shall be designees of Pinnacle.
4.
Financial Support. The Company shall utilize its best efforts to obtain such capital,
credit enhancement, and other financing as it may reasonably require to acquire, open, and place in
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operation individual repackaging centers serving appropriate market territories to provide the
services generally described in the Business Plan at the cost for capital expenditures, startup
expenses, and related expenditures as more particular described therein, subject to the achievement of
financial performance for centers previously placed in operation generally consist with the results of
operations forecast in such Business Plan.
5.
Employment Agreement. Contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the
Company shall enter into an executive employment agreement with Ninow.
6.
Stock Options for Other Key Employees. As the Company assembles its management
team of key executives during the next year, Pinnacle shall grant and issue to such key executives as
the Company may determine,when they become associated with the Company, options to purchase an
aggregate of 100,000 shares of common stock of the Company under and subject to the terms and
conditions of Pinnacle's 1989 Stock Option and Stock Award Plan.
7.
Incentive Compensation. The Company shall create a cash incentive compensation pool
based on the Company's pre-tax profits as a percentage of revenues, to be divided among the various
members of the executive management group of the Company, in such manner as the board of
directors of the Company may determine. The amount to be allocated to such incentive compensation
pool and to be allocated among and paid to such executives shall be determined as follows:
Percent of Pre-Tax
Profits AUocated
to Compensation Pool
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%

Pre-Tax Profits as a
Percentage of Gross Revenues
15%, but less than 20%
20%, but less than 25%
25%, but less than 30%
30%, but less than 35%
35% or more

Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000,
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be
allocated to such incentive compensation pool.
8,
Standard Textiles Products. The parties shall cooperate and utilize their best efforts to
obtain from Standard Textiles such reasonable assurances as Pinnacle and the Company may deem
adequate respecting the recognition of the conveyance by Ninow to the Company of the Business Plan
described herein, the initiation of such business by the Company, and the grant to the Company of an
exclusive marketing territory for selected markets for certain products.
9.

Indemnification

(a)
Pinnacle hereby agrees to indemnify the Company, its executive officers and
directors, against any and all Pinnacle liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses
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or damages that the Company or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result
of any action or failure to act by Pinnacle.
(b)
The Company hereby agrees to indemnify Pinnacle, its executive officers and
directors, against any and all Company liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses
or damages that Pinnacle or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result of
any action or failure to act by the Company.
10.

Term. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect through September 30,1996.

11.
Notice of Default. No party shall exercise any right or remedy on the alleged default of
the other party unless such party shall have failed to remedy such alleged default within 30 days after
notice thereof from the nondefaulting party.
12. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws of the state of Utah.
13.
Notices. All notices, demands, requests, or other communications required or authorized
hereunder shall be deemed given sufficiently if in writing and if personally delivered; if sent by
facsimile transmission, confirmed with a written copy thereof sent by overnight express delivery; if
sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid; or if sent by
overnight express delivery:
If to the Company, to:

EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc.
Attn: Todd B. Crosland
774 South 500 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No.: (801)359-7755

If to Ninow, to:

Mr. Frederick Ninow
7490 South Bekkemellom Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

or such other addresses and facsimile numbers as shall be furnished in writing by any party in the
manner for giving notices hereunder, and any such notice, demand, request, or other communication
shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so delivered or sent by facsimile transmission, three
days after the date so mailed, or one day after the date so sent by overnight delivery.
14. Attorneys' Fees. In the event that any party institutes any action or suit to enforce this
Agreement or to secure relief from any default hereunder or breach hereof, the breaching party or
parties shall reimburse the nonbreaching party or parties for all costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, incurred in connection therewith and in enforcing or collecting any judgment rendered therein.
15. Specific Performance. The parties acknowledge that the rights in this Agreement are
extraordinary and unique, 4nd that remedies at law may be inadequate to compensate the parties for
the breach or threatened breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The parties consent to
the granting of equitable relief, including specific performance or injunction, whether temporary,
preliminary, or final, in favor of the other party without proof of actual damages.
16. Survival: Termination. The representations, warranties, and covenants of the respective
parties shall survive the closing date and the consummation of the transactions herein contemplated.
17. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which
shall be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall be but a single instrument.
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18. No Assignment. This Agreement cannot be assigned in whole or in part by one of the
parties without the prior written consent of all other parties.
DATED as of the year and date first above written.

Frederick Ninow
ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.

d B. Crosland, President
PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.

Rv y\ ^f ^~--f^*-T*r<2
Rex Crd&land, President
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MANAGEMENT AND KEY PERSONNEL
Top management and key personnel consists of the following
ceopie, each of which brings a unique competence to the
management group of Repack Surgical Products.

President / CEO
Richard J. Hollingshead
Chief Financial Officer / Secretary
John Hales
Vice President / Marketing
Frederick Ninow
Vice President / Production and Materials Mgmt,
Joe Murray
Director / Operations
John Diston
Director / Inservice
Susan Kay Van Houten B.S.N, M.B.A.
Director / Research and Development
Jeff Taylor

^ -.^

Director / Facilities Development
Hal M. Magleby A ^ e.'-/V'*-^'
Consultant
Dr. Jerry Rees Nelson

^ c *^

Consultant
Don McKelvie

Lj^^^ry,
9

v

^ ,;^
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LETTER OF INTENT
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
:his "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized and
)existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and ROCHELLE MILLS
("Employee").
1.
INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991.
2.
Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall
be for three years.
3.

Compensation.

(a)
For all services rendered by Employee, the Company
shall pay a salary of $50,000 per year payable as earned in
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments.
All salary
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes.
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board
of directors of the Company.
(b) As
an incentive
compensation,
Employee
shall
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool.
(c) The Company shall provide health and medical
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time
employees.
(d) The
automobile.

(e)
fptrion.q

The
as

Company

Company

inrpr^.ivfr

to

shall

provide

shall

provide

Employee

into

Empl p y r ^ n f

enter

an

Employee

a

with

COMPANY

stock
Agreement

with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program.
These options will be determined by the company at the time of
employment.
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel
and similar items.

it^

re

(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid
vacation of at least two (2) weeks.

LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written.

ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.
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CERTIFIED COPY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-000JOHN DISTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 92 090 2269 CN
Deposition of:

ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS
INC., a Utah corporation,

Rochelle Mills-LaRocca
Judge Frank G. Noel

Counterclaimant,
vs.
JOHN DISTON,
Counterdefendant.

TRACI L. RAMIREZ, RPR, CSR, NP

Associated Professional Reporters
10 West Broadway / Suite 200 / Salt Lake City Utah 84101

-000BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of July, 1993,
the deposition of Rochelle Mills-LaRocca, produced as a
witness herein at the instance of the defendants herein,
in the above-entitled action now pending in the abovenamed court, was taken before Traci L. Ramirez, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 2:25 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of Kruse, Landa & Maycock, Eighth Floor, Bank One
Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice.
-000-

2

A P P E A R A N C E S
For t h e

Neil R. Sabin
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys at Law
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Plaintiff:

For t h e Defendants:

Ellen Maycock
David C. Wright
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorneys at Law
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Also Present:

John Diston
-000I N D E X

Witness

Page

Rochelle Mills-LaRocca
Examination by Ms. Maycock
Examination by Mr. Sabin

4
34
72

Further Examination by Ms. Maycock
-000E X H I B I T S
Number
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Page
Description
8
Company Overview
9
Letter of Intent
12
Organization Agreement
23
Employment Proposal
26
1/9/92 Correspondence
27
4/29/92 Correspondence

3

1

Saturday, when you met with Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston

2

about EnviroPak?

3

A

EnviroPak actually wasn't even —

I knew it as

4

Pinnacle. He had become involved with Pinnacle, and he

5

was very excited.

6

work for him and, hopefully, that we would get to meet the

7

key players there in a relative amount of time.

8
9

Q

And he said that we would be coming to

So as of September 20th, 1991, had you met

anybody from Pinnacle?

10

A

Uh-uh (negative).

11

Q

Had you dealt with anybody on behalf of

12

EnviroPak or Pinnacle other than Fred Ninow?

13

A

Not yet, no.

14

Q

Okay.

When you say you talked about salary and

15

how long your employment contract would be, and so on, you

16

had only talked to Fred Ninow about that?

17

A

Originally, yeah.

18

Q

As of the time he gave you this, he's the only

19

person you talked to?

20

A

Right.

21

Q

Did he show you anything else, at that point?

22

A

He showed me his contract that told us that he

23

had the authority to be giving me a letter of intent.

24

(Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 3 for

25

identification.)

12

can't ask John these answers, can I?
Q

No. We know what he thinks. We want your

memory.
A

Okay.

Q

If it might help, I think there were some trials

of the products that Mr. Ninow was selling in the spring
of 1991. Is that when you met him?
A

Right.

I met him through the hospital, working

with him on the trials.
Q

Did there come a time when you began to talk to

Mr. Ninow about going to work with him, or for him, or for
a company he was associated with?
A

Yes.

Q

When did you begin to talk to him about that?

A

I think it was about a month after I met him.

He came to me and asked if I would be interested —
because I was so interested in the product, if I might be
interested in working for him.

And I said that I would

be.
Q

At that time, who would you have been working

for, a particular company?
A

He was trying to get this business together, and

I guess it would have been him.

He was affiliated with a

company called Professional Medical before he became
affiliated with Pinnacle.

So I was just interested in

6

1

working with the product.

2

lot of stuff going on as far as —

3

who I would be working for.

4
5
6
7
8
9

Q

There was a lot of change and a
I didn't really know

We should probably clarify for the record what

product we7re talking about.
A

Reusable products, reusable surgical products:

gowns, drapes, things of that nature.
Q

As I understand it, the thing that was different

from what you had been doing in the operating room at Holy

10

Cross was that the surgical gowns, and so on, had been

11

disposable.

12

A

Right.

13

Q

And these products that Mr. Ninow was working

14

with were taken out and sterilized and laundered and used

15

again?

16

A

Exactly.

17

Q

Okay.

It was the whole process.

When you first began to talk to Mr. Ninow

18

about employment, did you talk about how much money you

19

would make, what your job would be?

20

A

We talked about what the job would be.

He said

21

there was going to be some changes happening within the

22

company, and he may be starting another company.

23

w a s real interested on what those changes would b e . W e

24

had originally gotten together with some other people to

25

talk about doing it on our own, b u t it looked like a

And so I

1

Exhibit 2 a document that's entitled "Letter of Intent to

2

Enter Employment Agreement."

3

you brought with you today, is it not?

That's one of the documents

4

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

5

Q

Tell me how you got ahold of that document to

6

begin with.

7

A

Actually, I got this document at the same time

8

that John got his.

9

afternoon.

10

We met with Fred on a Saturday

He brought it out and filled it out in front

of us, and signed it.

11

MR. SABIN:

12

MR. WRIGHT:

13

16
17

Did you get all of the pages?

There's writing on the back.

14
15

Do you have a copy?

THE WITNESS:

Oh, but that was another

conversation.
Q

(By MS. MAYCOCK)

Fred Ninow, and John Diston

We've got a meeting with you,
—

18

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

19

Q

—

20

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

21

Q

Can you give me an approximate date?

22

A

It was the date that this was signed.

23

on a Saturday afternoon?

I'm sure

September 20th is a Saturday, if we looked back for '91.

24

Q

Where were you?

25

A

We were at John Diston's house.

10

1
2
3

Q

You said, I think, that Fred Ninow filled it

A

Well, he had to obviously do this.

out.
We said that

4

we wanted something from him to see that he was serious

5

about a job possibility.

6

Q

So did he prepare it right there that day?

7

A

No.

He had this with him.

8

we had talked about.

9

about.

We had told him what

I had told him what I had talked

And then I don't know when he did this.

But he

10

had this with him that day, and he filled it out for us,

11

basically just by signing.

12
13
14
15

Q

When you say you had toid him what you had

talked about, tell me what you mean by that.
A

Well, I had talked about a three-year

compensation, salary rates, things like that.

16

Q

With Mr. Ninow?

17

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

18

Q

So there had been some discussions between you

19

and Mr. Ninow prior to this Saturday meeting?

20

A

A lot of discussions.

21

Q

About you going to work for EnviroPak?

22

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

Q

Or some company?

24

A

Yeah, with the reusables.

25

Q

Okay.

What did you know on that day, that

11

1

Saturday, when you met with Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston

2

about EnviroPak?

3

A

EnviroPak actually wasn't even —

I knew it as

4

Pinnacle.

5

was very excited.

6

work for him and, hopefully, that we would get to meet the

7

key players there in a relative amount of time.

8
9

Q

He had become involved with Pinnacle, and he
And he said that we would be coming to

So as of September 20th, 1991, had you met

anybody from Pinnacle?

10

A

Uh-uh (negative).

11

Q

Had you dealt with anybody on behalf of

12

EnviroPak or Pinnacle other than Fred Ninow?

13

A

Not yet, no.

14

Q

Okay.

When you say you talked about salary and

15

how long your employment contract would be, and so on, you

16

had only talked to Fred Ninow about that?

17

A

Originally, yeah.

18

Q

As of the time he gave you this, he's the only

19

person you talked to?

20

A

Right.

21

Q

Did he show you anything else, at that point?

22

A

He showed me his contract that told us that he

23

had the authority to be giving me a letter of intent.

24

(Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 3 for

25

identification.)

12

A

Yeah.

I mean, I didn 't read it from cover to

cover obviously, but this looks — this is the one,
because I remember his salary.
Q

So we're clear on the record, you think what he

showed you in your meeting on September 20th is the
"Executive Employment Agreement "?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

The Exhibit 2 that we'1ve talked about,

the "Letter of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement," I
assume when Fred Ninow gave it to you, it didn't have any
handwriting on it.
A

No, it didn't.

Q

Did you write that at a later time?

A

I wrote this at a later time when I was trying

to decide if it was something -- I have a consultant that
I work with when I'm going to be making major life
changes, and he was who I talked with on the phone.

So I

just wrote on there —
Q

You mean before you decided whether you wanted

to go to work for EnviroPak, you talked to a consultant?
A

Yeah.

Q

That's when you made your notes?

A

Right.

It was in the evening.

I can't even

remember when.
Q

Give me a time frame. Within a few days after

14

1

A

I met Rock and I met Todd and I met Rex.

2

are the ones that I remember most vividly.

3

the stockholders.

4

Q

What did you do at the meeting?

5

A

I sat up at the front.

Those

And some of

There was like a table

6

at the front, and I sat up there.

And when it came

7

time —

8

answered questions about my experience with the product.

9

And I also opened up a disposable pack and a reusable pack

they had a question and answer period, and I

10

so they could see the difference of how much waste you

11

would have with the disposable versus a reusable.

12

Q

How were you introduced?

13

A

Gosh, I feel like I should have just written

14

every single thing down.

15

Q

Well, none of us do that.

16

A

I think I was introduced as Rochelle Mills,

17

minor surgery coordinator of Holy Cross Hospital.

18

Q

Was John Diston also there?

19

A

Yes, he was.

20

Q

How was he introduced?

21

A

Probably —

I would have to say he was probably

22

introduced as the assistant director of the operating

23

room, I think.

24

Q

25

Cross?

But you were both introduced as people from Holy

20

A

Right•

Q

Not from EnviroPak?

A

Oh, no.

Q

At that time, did you talk to Todd Crosland or

Rock Schutjer or Rex Crosland about working for EnviroPak?
A
time.

No.

It wouldn't have been appropriate, at that

There was no privacy.

Q

It was too busy.

When was the first time that you talked to any

of those people about working for EnviroPak?
A

It was after I had given my notice, and Fred

called me up and said, You need to meet with more key
players.

So that's when I met with them.

Q

You went to their offices?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Who did you meet with?

A

I met Todd and I met Rock.

Q

Was Fred in the meeting also?

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

What did you talk about?

Let me ask you, first,

if you can give me a date.
A

Oh, gosh.

I can't. What was talked about was

they said that they wanted me to come to work for them.
And it was during that meeting I realized that Fred might
not have as much power as he had alluded to.
never saw this, this agreement.

Because they

And we talked money, and

21

we talked about the possibility of coming to work for
them.

And we set a date,

Q

Okay.

When you say "they never saw this," is

that something they said in the meeting, that they had not
seen your letter of intent that's Exhibit 2?
A

No.

It was just that when I went into the

meeting, it became apparent that Fred didn't have quite as
much power as he said he did.

And so I didn't think it

would be in my best interest to mention this at the time.
So I didn't.
Q

So it wasn't talked about?

A

It wasn't talked about. And they offered me a

job.

So I felt like I was okay, thus writing all over

this.

Obviously, if I thought it was an important

document, I probably wouldn't have.
Q

Well, the handwriting, had you done that before

or after you met with Todd and Rock?
A

I think this was before I met with them.

Q

Because you just said something about, you

wouldn't have written all over it if you thought it was
important.
A

Well, yeah.

Because after I met with them and

they did a letter of intent, or whatever you want to call
it that you see attached there, that's what they did. So
I thought, Well, I've got that. And this was laying on

22

the counter when I was taking some notes on the telephone.
Q

So it got to be the note pad?

A

That's right.

Q

That's what happens in my house.

Everything that's close to me, I

grab.

MS. MAYCOCK:

Let's mark this.

(Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 4 for
identification.)
Q

(By MS. MAYCOCK)

We've marked as Deposition

Exhibit 4 a document that's entitled "Employment Proposal
for Rochelle Mills," and it's signed by Todd Crosland.

Is

that what came out of your meeting with Todd Crosland and
Rock Schutjer and Fred Ninow?
A

Right.

Q

Were there differences between that employment

proposal and the terms that were on the letter of intent?
A

There were.

The original letter of intent was

for three years, and they were not willing to do that.
They only wanted to go for one year.

same.

Q

What else?

A

I think other than that, it was basically the
They paid for expenses, automobile.

Oh, no.

I did

not get stock options, and I originally talked about stock
options with Fred.

So I didn't receive any stock options.

And we had originally talked about what you would make the

23

1

first year, what you would make the second year, and what

2

you'd make the third year, and that is not in the

3

actually, it's not in either of them.

4
5
6
7
8
9

Q

—

But you had discussed with Fred Ninow that you

would have annual increases, or something like that?
A

Right, yeah, if everything went the way we

wanted it to,
Q

The other difference that would seem to me to

exist is, Exhibit 4 has a job description, and the letter

10

of intent, Exhibit 2, doesn't describe what your duties

11

were or what your title would be.

12

A

That's true.

13

Q

When did you begin to work for EnviroPak?

14

A

I think that it was October 24th.

The same day

15

that I quit Holy, I went to work for EnviroPak.

I worked

16

a half a morning at Holy, and then I worked at EnviroPak.

17

Q

No days off, huh?

18

A

No, I didn't take any time off.

19

Q

After you met with Todd and Rock and Fred Ninow,

20

and I think you said you found that Fred Ninow didn't have

21

as much power to do things as you had previously thought,

22

did you report that to John Diston?

23

A

What I said to John was that it didn't go the

24

way that I had originally thought that it would go.

25

Because Fred had talked money with me.

But then when push

24

1

came to shove, it was actually Rock who was the one that

2

discussed money.

3

didn't go exactly the way I wanted, but that I was hired.

4
5

I told John after my meeting that it

Q

How soon after the meeting did you tell this to

A

Well, the meeting was during my workday.

John?

6

So I

7

left work to go to the meeting, and came back and saw him

8

later.

9

Q

So that very same day?

10

A

Yeah.

11

Q

Did you tell him something to the effect that,

12

Fred Ninow wasn't the sole decisionmaker about these

13

issues of salary and terms of employment?

14

A

I can't really remember exactly what I said.

I

15

think I just told him that the meeting didn't go exactly

16

as I had planned, but that I was hired.

17

Q

Did you give him any advice about his future

18

employment?

19

A

Not really.

I knew that he was hoping to come

20

to work for them.

21

though John and I had worked really closely together and

22

we were with Fred, we weren't really being hired as a

23

team.

24

was interviewing for myself.

25

But when I had the interview, even

So, obviously, I didn't bring his name up when I

Q

Did you tell John that the terms you got hired

25

1

on were different from those in the letter of intent?

2

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

3

Q

You told him that that same day?

4

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

5

Q

We're thinking this meeting is the second or

6

third week of October?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

Is Exhibit 4 the only written agreement that you

9

had with EnviroPak about your employment?

10

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

11

Q

Please say yes or no.

12

It's easier for the court

reporter.

13

A

I'm sorry.

14

Q

Sometimes those uh-huhs and uh-uhs

15

A

I keep wondering what she's doing on there.

16

Q

Let me ask you a couple of other things.

17
18
19

I've never done this before.
—

(Whereupon, marked Deposition Exhibit 5 for
identification.)
Q

(By MS. MAYCOCK)

What we've marked as

20

Deposition Exhibit 5 is another document you brought with

21

you today.

22

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

Q

It seems to be a letter dated January 9, 1992,

24

to a mortgage company.

Was this verification of

25

employment, that kind of thing?

26

1
2
3

A

Oh, yeah.

They were all —

they were great to

work for.
Q

Other than that meeting we've talked about at

4

Little America with Pinnacle shareholders, and so on, did

5

you attend any meetings with stockholders, anything else

6

like that?

7

A

You mean just like that one?

8

Q

Or kind of like that one.

9

A

I attended —

I think it was one or two stock

10

meetings, but I wasn't —

I was just there as an observer,

11

because I had some stock in the company.

12

Q

You were more audience than show?

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

And that was the one at Little America?

15

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

16

Q

Do you think you ever saw the "Organization

17
18

I only really did it one time.

Agreement" that we marked as Exhibit 3, before today?
A

I don't think it was this one.

Because the one

19

that I vividly recall seeing was on my way down to Las

20

Vegas, and that was what he had made that had the $100,000

21

a year.

22

Q

Now I'm confused.

The "Executive Employment

23

Agreement"?

24

A

Yeah.

25

Q

You think you saw that on the way to Las Vegas?
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